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Donald Mangum 
The primary aim of this paper will be to provide 
the reader of Spinoza with a certain approach to the 
Ethics. The approach is designed to prevent what I 
believe to be certain natural misconceptions concern-
ing the presuppositions behind the text. In general 
these presuppositions have to do with method. Spinoza 
begins, first, by giving us definitions of things; e.g., 
God, Substance, etc.; second, by giving us axioms about 
the natures of things, and then proceeds to deduce , in 
geometrical order, propositions about the more complex 
natures of things. How are we to read such a method? 
A natural approach to any method of discovery about 
things, as this one seems to be, is to read through 
the method into the subject matter itself. For in-
stance, if one points to the moon and says, "Look 
there, we do not look at his finger; we look beyond 
it to the moon itself. Here the method is trans-
parent ; we look through it, not as intrinsically an 
object of concern, but as an object of concern, never-
theless. But what of such a method's employment in an 
ethical inquiry? Assuming that one's ethical interests 
are in the structuring of one's conduct or behavior— 
i.e., in what one should do with oneself—the case seems 
no different. Geometry itself is often employed in de-
termining how one should do certain things. For ex-
ample, the architect employs the geometric order to 
discover the laws of the triangle. Those laws then 
prescribe the manner in which he is to build, say, a 
bridge. The method of proof is important to the archi-
tect only to the extent that it reveals for him those 
properties of the triangle which prescribe the manner 
in which to build a bridge. Method is not, here, in-
trinsically, the object of concern, but is, rather, a 
mediator or vehicle rendering Being ascessible to an 
interested party. What is interesting to note, here, 
is the passive relationship which the ardiitect has 
with the triangle he discovers. Such is the conse-
quence of the prescriptive nature of the triangle with 
respect to the architect's interests—a seemingly nat-
ural approach . But as natural as these approaches 
may be to the methodological order of the Ethics, they 
are, as I will soon show, harmful to a proper under-
standing of the work. 
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What one needs to know to prepare for'Spinoza's 
method is to be found in the treatise, On the Improve-
ment of the Understanding. In this paper I will in-
vestigate some of the presuppositions that lie behind 
Spinoza's method. As it turns out, method is, for 
Spinoza, not a means for discovery, which means is to 
be read through. Method is a construction out of it-
self. It is a process of mental growth or development. 
It is, itself, the object of intrinsic concern. 
But before the direct consideration of any method, 
it is first necessary to determine precisely what it is 
that the method is intended to accomplish. In the first 
paragraph in 0n_ the Improvement of the Understanding, we 
read, 
After experience had taught me that all 
the usual surroundings of social life are vain 
and futile; seeing that none of the objects of 
my fears contained in themselves anything 
either good or bad, except in so far as the 
mind is affected by them, I finally resolved 
to inquire whether there might be some real 
good having power to communicate itself, which 
would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion 
of all else: whether, in fact, there might be 
anything of which the discovery and attainment 
would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, 
and unending happiness.! 
It is a large order, but it is a clear one. We seek an 
affection of the mind whereby to be as happy as possible. 
If we read this passage carefully we get a foreshadowing 
of much of the flavor and tone of the Ethics already. 
If what we seek is neither good nor bad except in so 
far as the mind is affected by it, then we may certainly 
anticipate a subjectivistic outcome in the Ethics it-
self. Whatever the method, it must be designed to ef-
fect a certain state of mind. Later, Spinoza is more 
specific in telling us what sort of affection of the 
mind this is to be. It is,"...the knowledge of the 
union existing between the mind and the whole of Na-
ture. "2 Just how such knowledge can be the highest 
good for man, we, of course, do not yet see. It is 
enough, however, to understand that what the method 
is to accomplish is to attain to a certain knowledge. 
Spinoza also specifies that this is to be knowledge of 
a certain kind; namely, "...the perception arising when 
a thing is perceived solely through its essence, or 
through the knowledge of its proximate cause."3 The 
method for attaining knowledge of the specified type 
must, therefore, consist, as least partially, in aquir-
ing knowledge of essences and/or proximate causes. 
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Having thus examined some of Spinoza's presuppositions 
concerning what is to be accomplished in an ethical 
inquiry, we may now consider more directly his choice 
of method. 
In discussing what method is to be employed, 
Spinoza warns against involving oneself in an infinite 
regress: "...that is, in order to discover the best 
method for finding out the truth, there is no need of 
another method to discover such method; nor of a third 
method for discovering the second, and so on to infin-
ity."1* What this means is that in choosing the proper 
method, we must avoid the approach which asks, How do 
we know that we know a thing?, for we are then forced 
into the question, How do we know that we know that we 
know a thing?, and so on ad infinitum. The problem, 
however, is that the question, How do we know that we 
know a thing?, seems to be a perfectly valid question. 
Moreover, it is a question which some philosophers , as 
we shall soon see, are obliged, by the nature of their 
claims to knowledge, to answer. Spinoza, on the other 
hand, disclaims any such obligation. The fact that 
Spinoza denies this obligation is perhaps the most 
significant aspect of his method. He denies it for two 
reasons, both of which, taken together reveal not only 
the most basic ideas behind the method itself, but also 
a major portion of the theme of the Ethics as a whole. 
The first reason is given in the form of an anal-
ogy. In order to construct a mechanism, it is first 
necessary to have at one's disposal certain tools. In 
order to construct these tools, it is, in turn, neces-
sary to have certain other tools. But there were obvi-
ously some primitive first tools with which to start 
the chain of construction, for otherwise there would be 
no complex mechanisms which there obviously are. Even 
if there were an infinite regress of the tools required 
to make more complex tools, it would be absurd to argue 
on the basis of this infinite regress that there are no 
mechanisms or tools, for there obviously are. Likewise, 
in the case of knowledge and the method for aquiring it, 
a complex idea requires, for its construction, simpler 
ideas. For example, we cannot form the idea of a circle 
unless we already have the ideas of a line and of the 
possibility of rotating that line with one point fixed. 
We cannot, in turn, have the idea of a line unless we 
already have the simpler ideas of two points. But though 
we may well ask of certain complex ideas how they were 
acquired, it would be absurd to claim that an infinite 
regress of simpler ideas contradicts the possibility of 
an idea of a circle, for we obviously have such an idea. 
The point is not that the question, How is knowledge 
possible?, is not a valid question; it is simply that 
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one is not obliged to answer it in order to 'lay claim 
to knowledge. 
Now if we examine the analogy of the tools more 
closely* we notice a rather peculiar assumption that 
Spinoza is making about knowledge. The analogy holds 
only for the aquiring of knowledge as entirely an active 
affair. Ideas are, here, constructions by-the mind 
rather than innate, pre-established entities or passive 
receptions from the world. Needless to say, such an 
assumption would require a rather explicit theory of 
knowledge in order to be valid. Spinoza does offer such 
a theory; namely, the theory of knowledge as subjective 
essence. Me relies even more heavily on this theory in 
his second reason for denying the obligation to answer 
the question of how we know that we know. Briefly, the 
theory portrays knowledge as an independent power of 
the mind--independent, that is, from both its objective 
correlate and any higher method of verification. But 
before going further into this theory, it will be use-
ful, first, to see how it works for Spinoza in avoiding 
the infinite regress of methods. 
The second reason for dismissing the question of 
how we know that we know consists in the fact that 
knowledge as the subjective essence of the thing known, 
and as, therefore, an actuality in and of itself, does 
not depend, for its existence, on the knowledge of it. 
For example, the idea of a circle is not itself circular. 
It is therefore something different from the circle it-
self; namely, the subjective essence of the circle. 
The idea of the circle also allows of being the object 
of another idea, which is precisely the case when we 
ask of the idea of a circle how such an idea is possible. 
The idea of the idea of the circle is the subjective 
essence of the subjective essence of the circle. But 
by forming this second subjective essence, we by no 
means alter the first. In fact the second subjective 
essence depends on the first, which is what Spinoza 
means when he says that, "...in order to know that I 
know, I must first know."5 The fact that we may form 
this second level subjective essence of the idea of the 
circle by asking, How is knowledge of the circle pos-
sible? , does not alter the status of the first level 
subjective essence; that is, it is still knowledge. 
Thus, in order to claim to know a thing, it is not neces-
sary to answer the question, How do I know that I know?, 
if I do, in fact, know. 
Now the significance of these arguments lies in the 
fact that they simply will not work if, by knowledge, we 
mean a state of affection of the mind which depends , for 
its nature, on something other than itself. For example, 
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a causal theorist of knowledge would have to justify his 
claim to know a thing by reference to the thing itself; 
that is, he would have to show that the thing of which 
he had the idea did in fact cause his idea. This he 
cannot, of course, do for in order to show that the ob-
ject caused his idea, he would first have to have knowl-
edge of the object, which is, itself, what is to be 
proved.6 Hence, if by "the knowledge of a circle," 
Spinoza meant an idea caused by some separate extended 
figure, then he could not point to the knowledge of the 
circle as proof of the fact that he has knowledge, for 
then he would have to show that the extended figure did 
in fact cause his idea, which would require that he know 
the extended circle, which is, itself, the thing to be 
proved. With regard to knowledge as the subjective es-
sence of a thing—that is, an idea which is an actuality • 
separate from its object, and which allows of being the 
object of another idea or knowledge—such a knowledge 
could not, by definition, be a state of mind which de-
pends for its nature on something other than itself. 
This is simply what it means to say that the idea is 
separate from its object, or, in Spinoza's words, "... 
as it is something different from its correlate, it is 
capable of being understood through itself..."7 if 
knowledge were dependent for its nature on something 
other than itself, then we obviously could not understand 
it through itself alone, but only through that on which 
it depends for its nature. 
What are we to make of these arguments? The first 
states, in effect, that it is absurd to question that 
we know, for we already have the answer; that is, we do 
know. The second states, in effect that it is unneces-
sary to question how we know as long as all we desire 
is that we know. I suggest that the best way to take 
these arguments is simply as characterizations of 
knowledge in Spinoza's sense. Spinoza says, immedi-
ately after giving the arguments, 
Hence it is clear that certainty is nothing 
else than the subjective essence of a thing; in 
other words , the mode in which we perceive an 
actual reality is certainty. Further, it is 
also evident that, for the certitude of truth, 
no further sign is necessary beyond the posses-
sion of a true idea: for, as I have shown, it 
is not necessary to know that we know that we 
know.8 
True knowledge is therefore, an independent power 
of the mind. It owes no apologies, either to the ex-
tended world in itself or to a higher verificatory 
knowledge. What, then, is to be the method for aquir-
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ing knowledge of this sort? Spinoza says that method, 
"...is nothing else than reflective knowledge, of the 
idea of an idea; and ...as there can be no, idea of an 
idea—unless an idea exists previously—there can be 
no method without a pre-existent idea."9 But the reflec-
tive knowledge of this pre-existent idea is, of course, 
not the whole of the method. To understand further how 
reflective knowledge is to count as method we may return 
to the analogy of the tools. We possess certain simple 
tools whereby to construct more complex tools, which, 
in turn, are used to construct still more complex tools. 
We find a similar process of construction in reflective 
knowledge as method for aquiring more complex knowledge. 
For example, taking the simple idea of a point together 
with another simple idea of a point, we form the more 
complex idea of a line. Taking this idea of a line 
together with the idea of rotating that line, we form 
the idea of a circle. Again, from this idea, the ideas 
of an infinity of equal rectangles follow. But all 
these ideas are but independent powers of the m i n d — 
independent, that is, of extended lines, circles, and 
rectangles. They are pure constructions by the mind 
of complex ideas out of simple ideas. They are to be 
understood solely through themselves and without refer-
ence to anything beyond themselves. The certainty of 
these truths, i.e., the certainty of the properties of 
the circle, lies wholly in the reflective activity of 
the mind. It is not the truth of these properties that 
assures us that we have knowledge thereof; it is, rather, 
our knowledge of these properties that assures us of their 
truth. In Spinoza's words, "the mode in which we perceive 
an actual reality is certainty." 
Let us return now to what it is that is to be 
accomplished by our method. It is to aquire an affec-
tion of the mind that will bring supreme and unending 
happiness. This affection of the mind is the knowl-
edge of the union that exists between the mind and the 
whole of Nature. As it is a knowledge that we wish to 
acquire, the method will be that of a construction out 
of simpler knowledge. The Ethics is, therefore, not an 
attempt to discover the good; it is an attempt to create 
the good! Any other reading of the book will be a mis-
reading. This is, of course, not to say that the union 
of the mind with the whole of Nature does not exist 
prior to the knowledge of that union; it is simply to 
say that such a union does not, in and of itself, con-
stitute the highest good for man. The good for man is 
the subjective essence of this union, which essence is 
to be understood through itself, and not through its 
correlate. We have, at our disposal, certain tools for 
the construction of this idea, or knowledge. The sim-
plest of these tools are the definitions and axioms at 
the beginning of each part of the Ethics. With these 
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definitions and axioms we are able to construct more and 
more complex ideas which are the propositions of the 
Ethics. But though we may, to some extent, structure our 
lives in accordance with some of the things that these 
propositions tell us—that is, though some of these 
propositions may take on a prescriptive character—the 
method is not for us prescriptive to the extent that it 
is for the architect. 
I have, of course, not given anything like a 
thorough exposition or elucidation of Spinoza's method, 
nor have I intended to. What I have covered (and that 
only briefly) is basically the first part of Spinoza's 
system of choosing a method. The rest consists in 
actually putting this theory to work; for instance, 
putting ideas in the form of a definition. I think, 
though, that the theory itself is all that is needed 
in order to prevent a misreading of the text. In other 
words, as long as we do not attempt to read through the 
method, as we read through the finger to the moon, then 
we will be able to read the text as it was written; 
namely, as the activity of the mind at its fullest po-
tential, for it is precisely that potential which con-
stitutes the highest good for man. 
Louisiana State University 
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NOTES 
•'•Spinoza, Benedict de, Ethics, ed. James Gutmann, 
Hafner Press, New York, reprint 197H, p. 3. 
2Ibid. p. 6. 
3lbid. p. 8. 
'•Ibid. p. 10. 
5Ibid. p. 12. 
^We may recall, here, Locke, for whom our knowl-
edge of an object is through secondary qualities which 
are "caused by," though not identical with what inheres 
in the object itself. But as Hume was able to show, 
since our knowledge consists solely in the "effect," we 
can have no knowledge of a "cause" ; not even the knowl-
edge that there is_ a cause. 
7Ibid. p. 11. 
8Ibid. p. 12. 
9Ibid. p. 13. 
